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A NEW APPROACH TO TRANSNATIONAL
INSOLVENCIES
Robert K. Rasmussen*
Business failure has gone international.' The financial distress of a
firm is no longer confined to territorial borders. When a multinational
firm fails, the effects are felt in a number of countries. Such a firm has
employees, creditors, customers, stockholders, and interested communities scattered across various jurisdictions. These constituencies all suffer
losses when a multinational enterprise cannot meet its obligations. Employees may lose their jobs, creditors may not recover funds that they
are owed, customers may have to turn elsewhere for goods, stockholders
may lose their investment, and communities may lose an important
contributor to the quality of life.
The advent of international business failure has led to an increasing
debate over which country's laws should mete out its consequences A
multinational corporation has significant contacts with a variety of jurisdictions. Each of these jurisdictions has its own bankruptcy law.
These laws are often designed to serve different purposes. For example,
it is common wisdom that the U.S. bankruptcy law in large measure
seeks to promote corporate reorganization, 3 whereas the laws of some
*
Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School. J.D., University of Chicago (1985); B.A.,
Loyola University of Chicago (1982). I would like to thank Pat Bauer, Rebecca Brown, John
Goldberg, Ronald Mann, Frank Kennedy, Lynn LoPucki, Bill Reppy, and Joel Trachtman,
who provided helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article. The article has also benefited greatly from comments made at faculty presentations at the Michigan, Vanderbilt, Iowa,
Duke and Berkeley law schools as well as comments made at the George Mason Donner
Conference on Free Contracting in Bankruptcy. I am grateful to the Dean's Fund at Vanderbilt Law School for financial support.
1. While I am unaware of any systematic attempts to document the incidence of transnational bankruptcies, the increasing attention that practicing attorneys are devoting to this
problem, and the general trend towards a global economy suggest that the such bankruptcies
are on the rise. See, e.g., DEVELOPING YOUR INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY PRACTICE (Michelle
Laque Johnson ed., 1995).
2. The cases which have generated the most attention to date are the insolvencies of
Maxwell Communications, Bank of Credit & Commerce International (BCCI), and Olympia
& York. See In re Maxwell Communications Corp., 170 B.R. 800 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994);
Hal S. Scott, Supervision of InternationalBanking Post-BCCI,8 GA. ST. L. REV. 487 (1992);
In re Olympia & York Developments Ltd. [1993] 12 O.R.3d 500 (Ont. Gen. Div.).
3. See Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11,
101 YALE L.J. 1043, 1043-44 (1992); Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice: A Menu
Approach to Corporate Reorganization,72 TEX. L. REV. 51, 78-79 (1992); Elizabeth Warren, The Untenable Casefor Repeal of Chapter 11, 102 YALE L.J. 437, 467-68 (1992);
Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World, 92 MICH. L. REV. 336
(1994).
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countries are often more solicitous of the interests of creditors. 4 Similarly, certain creditors may receive preferred treatment under the laws of

one country ' while receiving less generous treatment at the hands of
another sovereign. Even where different regimes agree on a certain
policy, such as discouraging preferential payments on the eve of bankruptcy, they may differ in the ways in which they implement such
policy, thus providing the same creditor with different treatment depending on which law governs the resolution of its claim.6
Historically, countries have paid little attention to these conflicts.7
When a multinational firm became insolvent, each jurisdiction would
"grab" the assets within its borders and administer those assets with
little regard to any foreign proceeding involving the insolvent firm.' This
"territorial approach" to bankruptcy law has been criticized for a number of years.9 These criticisms have led to modest reforms. For example,
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code represents a tentative congressional step toward

cooperation in dealing with the financial distress of a multinational firm.
4. For a comparison of U.S. and European bankruptcy laws, see Michelle J. White, The
Costs of Corporate Bankruptcy: A U.S.-European Comparison, in CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 467 (Jagdeep S. Bhandari & Lawrence E.

Weiss eds., 1996); Daniel J. Arbess et al., New Bankruptcy Laws: A Comparison of the
Bankruptcy Laws of the Czech Republic, Poland, and Russia, 1 PARKER SCH. J.E. EUROP. L.
128 (1994). For a comparison of United States and Canada's insolvency laws, see Lynn M.
LoPucki & George G. Triantis, A Systems Approach to Comparing U.S. and Canadian
Reorganizationof FinanciallyDistressedCompanies, 35 HARV J. INT'L L. 267 (1994).
5. The U.S. Bankruptcy Code, for example, accords priority to tax claims and, in certain cases, the claims of U.S. fishermen. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8) (1994) (tax claims); 11
U.S.C. § 507(a)(5)(B) (1994) (U.S. fishermen).
6. For example, the U.S. Bankruptcy Code allows the recovery of many payments
made by the debtor within ninety days of the filing of the bankruptcy petition. 11 U.S.C.
§ 547 (1994). English law, in contrast, has a four month reachback period. See Insolvency
Act, 1986, § 240(l)(b) (Eng.). Moreover, whereas English law requires that the debtor
intended to prefer the creditor for the transfer to be deemed a preference, (see id. § 239(5)),
U.S. law does not consider the debtor's intent as legally relevant. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)
(1994).
7. See Jay Lawrence Westbrook & Donald T. Trautman, Conflicts of Laws Issues in
International Insolvencies, in CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW 655-56 (Jacob S. Zeigel ed., 1994).

8. See Charles D. Booth, Recognition of Foreign Bankruptcies: An Analysis and Critique of the Inconsistent Approaches of the United States Courts, 66 AM. BANKR. L.J. 135,
135-47 (1992); Kurt H. Nadelman, RehabilitatingInternationalBankruptcy: Lessons Taught
by Herstatt and Company, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1977); Donald T. Trautman et al., Four
Models for InternationalBankruptcy, 41 AM. J. COMP. L. 573, 574-75 (1993); Jay Lawrence
Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism in Global Insolvencies: Choice of Law and Choice of
Forum, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 457,460 (1991).
9. See Douglas G. Boshkoff, Some Gloomy Thoughts Concerning Cross-BorderInsolvencies, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 931 (1994); John Lowell, Conflict of Laws as Applied to
Assignments for Creditors, 1 HARV. L. REV. 259, 264 (1888); Jay Lawrence Westbrook,
Choice of Avoidance Law in Global Insolvencies, 17 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 499 (1991); Westbrook, supra note 8.
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Section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code allows, but does not require, a U.S.
bankruptcy court to assist a foreign insolvency proceeding.'0 This provision applies to a multinational firm that has its "home" in another
country, assets in the United States, and has filed for bankruptcy in the
other country. The representative of the debtor's estate in the foreign
bankruptcy case can attempt to enlist a U.S. bankruptcy court as an
ancillary to the foreign proceeding." When a U.S. bankruptcy court
decides to act in this capacity, its primary functions are to stop debt
collection efforts in the United States, gather the debtor's assets located
in the United States, and turn them over to the foreign representative for
distribution according to the terms of the foreign bankruptcy proceeding. To date, U.S. bankruptcy courts applying Section 304 have reached
disparate results as to whether or not they will act as an ancillary to the
foreign bankruptcy proceeding.
Other countries have also sought to increase international cooperation in the bankruptcy area. The Council of Europe drafted a treaty
designed to mediate conflicts which arise when a firm has contacts with
more than one European country. 3 This treaty was ready for signature in
199014 and has been signed by eight countries, 5 but has yet to enter into

force. 6 The Scandinavian countries have been leaders in this regard,
having established a treaty to handle intra-Scandinavian bankruptcies in
1933." Despite these efforts to foster greater cooperation in transnational bankruptcies, in practice, noncooperation remains the norm."

10. See 11 U.S.C. § 304(1994).
11. See id. § 304(b).
12. Compare In re Culmer, 25 B.R. 621 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) (allowing ancillary proceeding), with In re Papeleras Reunidas, S.A., 92 B.R. 584 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y 1988) (holding
that statutory considerations required dismissal of ancillary proceeding). See also Booth,

supra note 8. For a history of U.S. law prior to the adoption of Section 304, see Charles D.
Booth, A History of the TransnationalAspects of United States Bankruptcy Law Priorto the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,9 B.U. INT'L L.J. 1 (1991).
13. See European Convention on Certain International Aspects of Bankruptcy, Nov. 5,

1990, Europ. T.S. No. 136.
14. Id.
15. See Chart of Signatures and Ratifications, European Convention on Certain Aspects
of Bankruptcy, Council of Europe: European Treaties, No. 136 (March 3, 1997).

16. For the Convention to enter into force, three countries must ratify it (see Article 34);
to date, only one (Cyprus) has done so. See Chart of Signatures and Ratifications, supra note
15.
17. See Sverges overenskommelser med frammande makter 1934: 8. The Convention
was amended in 1977 and 1982 (Sverges overenskommelser medframmande makter 1978:
10 and 1982: 85).
18. The United States is not a party to any bilateral or multilateral bankruptcy treaty.
One recent attempt to increase international cooperation in this area is the model law drafted
by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) and INSOL
International. See Daniel M. Glosband, UNCITRAL Adopts Model Cross-BorderInsolvency

MichiganJournal of InternationalLaw

[Vol. 19:1

Most academic writing in this area has deplored the extant state of
affairs and called for greater cooperation when faced with a transnational
bankruptcy.19 The ultimate goal for many is a universal bankruptcy law
which would apply to all firms? ° Having a single law would obviate the
problems caused by attempting to apply multiple sets of laws to a single
firm. A notable failing of the existing literature, however, is that it does
not suggest what the content of this law should be. A bad law which
applies to everyone has little normative appeal. This article remedies

this deficiency in the existing literature. Beginning with the assumption
that the overall goal of bankruptcy law, at least in the corporate setting,
should be efficiency,21 this article develops the contours of an efficient
multinational insolvency law.
Private international law is built on the concept of voluntary agreement between the affected parties. Indeed, contracting parties are often
allowed more freedom in the international realm than the domestic.22
This principle of private contractual choice should be extended to the
selection of insolvency rules.2 3 The owners of firms, not governments,
are better positioned to select the insolvency rule which best maximizes
Law, BANKR. CT. DECISIONS: WEEKLY NEWS & COMMENT, June 24, 1997, at A3. It is
unclear how successful this attempt at cooperation in transnational insolvencies will be.
19. See, e.g., Westbrook, supra note 8; Boshkoff, supra note 9; Lucian Arye Bebchuk &
Andrew T. Guzmdn, An Economic Analysis of TransnationalBankruptcies, Discussion Paper
No. 180 (Harvard Law School, Feb. 1996).
20. See, e.g., Thomas M. Gaa, Harmonization of International Bankruptcy Law and
Practice:Is it Necessary? Is it Possible?, 27 INT'L LAW. 881, 906-09 (1993); John D. Honsberger, Conflict of Laws and the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 30 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
631, 633-34 (1980); Westbrook, supra note 9, at 514-15.
21. Many bankruptcy academics embrace the efficiency norm. See, e.g., Barry E. Adler,
Financialand Political Theories of American CorporateBankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 311
(1993); Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to
Warren, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 815 (1987); James W. Bowers, The Fantastic Wisconsylvania
Zero-Bureaucratic-CostSchool of Bankruptcy Theory: A Comment, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1773
(1993); Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 3, at 1056 n.44; THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE
LOGIC AND LIMrrs OF BANKRUPTCY LAW (1986). Others, however, have argued that efficiency must be tempered by concerns of distributive justice. See KAREN GROSS, FAILURE
AND FORGIVENESS: REBALANCING THE BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM (1997); Donald R. Korobkin,
Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of Bankruptcy, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 717 (1991);
Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World, supra note 3. I have argued elsewhere that embracing redistribution as a societal goal does not imply that bankruptcy law
should be the mechanism of such redistribution. See Robert K. Rasmussen, An Essay on
Optimal Bankruptcy Rules and Social Justice, U. ILL. L. REV. 1 (1994).
22. Compare The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co, 407 U.S. 1 (1972) (allowing broad
enforcement of choice of forum and choice of law clauses in international contracts) with
Stewart v. Ricoh, 487 U.S. 22 (1988) (holding that party selection not determinative).
23. I have made a similar argument in the domestic context. See Rasmussen, supra note
3. Others have also embraced this general concept. See Adler, supra note 21; Alan Schwartz,
Contracting About Bankruptcy, 13 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 127 (1997); Alan Schwartz, Bankruptcy Workouts andDebt Contracts,36 J.L. & ECON. 595 (1993).
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firm value. To increase the gains from private choice, firms should have
a menu of insolvency rules from which they can choose. This choice
would first be made at incorporation, and could be amended, subject to
certain restrictions, as the structure of the firm changes. Placing the
choice of insolvency rules in the private domain would eliminate the
perceived problems with current law and would increase social welfare.
Despite the normative desirability of a menu-based system, such
radical reform is unlikely in the near future. Existing law, however,
offers a second-best solution. Private international law generally recognizes the validity of forum-selection clauses and choice of law clauses
in private contracts.24 This principle of contractual choice should be
extended to insolvency matters. If a firm were to place a provision in its
corporate charter stating that it would file for bankruptcy only in a certain jurisdiction, which would then handle the bankruptcy proceeding
according to its own law, all creditors of the firm should be bound by
this choice of forum provision. If courts were to accept such an argument, this would introduce a measure of private choice into the selection
of insolvency rules. Although this solution is inferior to the menu approach because it provides fewer options for a firm, it is superior to the
current confusion in the transnational insolvency area because it allows
a firm to select the best law from those countries which have an interest
in its operations.
Part I of this article sets forth the general problems associated with
transnational bankruptcies. Part II then shows that, from an efficiency
standpoint, the optimal solution would be to allow firms to select, at the
time of incorporation, which set of bankruptcy rules will govern in the
event of financial distress. Part III examines the transnational bankruptcy problem under the assumption that each nation will continue to
dictate the content of its bankruptcy laws. The accepted wisdom is that
under this assumption, the best solution to transnational insolvencies is
for all countries to adopt a rule whereby the home jurisdiction of the
firm controls the entire bankruptcy proceeding.5 Part III shows that this
solution erroneously assumes that a single proceeding is optimal for all
firms. Instead, it is more efficient to allow firms to select which country's or countries' laws will apply if the firm encounters financial
distress. Although this proposal is not as normatively appealing as that

24. See The Bremen, 407 U.S. 1; Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 506-516
(1974).
25. See Westbrook, supra note 8, at 461 (stating that there is "nearly unanimous agree-

ment across the world that the financial difficulties of a multinational should be resolved in
one central forum").
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set fort in Part II, it represents an improvement over both the current
state of affairs and the most commonly suggested alternative.
I. THE TRANSNATIONAL BANKRUPTCY PROBLEM
The transnational bankruptcy problem stems from the fact that each
country has its own set of insolvency rules. These differing rules lead to
potential forum shopping incentives on the part of both creditors and
debtors. These incentives often ensure that more than one country is
asked to resolve the financial distress of a single, multinational enterprise. This part first details the incentives that lead to the initiation of
multiple bankruptcy proceedings, and then examines the problems that
such proceedings cause.
A. The Incentives to Initiate Multiple Insolvency Proceedings
Consider first the situation faced by creditors of a multinational firm
that runs into financial difficulty by means of the following hypothetical
situation. Assume a company with its main office and a majority of its
assets in France, which is therefore considered the "home" jurisdiction,26
but with substantial assets in the United States. 7 The firm, which has a
number of U.S. creditors, begins an insolvency proceeding in France."'
Each U.S. creditor has two options: (1) it can go to France, press its
claim in the French tribunal, and be satisfied with the payout which it
receives; or (2) it could attempt to have its dispute resolved in this
country.
A U.S. creditor could proceed in the United States in one of two
ways. First, it could proceed under state law and attempt to levy on the
assets located in this country. Any such attempt, however, could be met
by a bankruptcy petition filed under Section 304 by a foreign representative of the debtor.29 A foreign representative is the person empowered
26. There are any number of rules by which one could identify a "home" jurisdiction.
One could look to where the majority of the assets are located, where the home office of the
company is located, or where most of the transactions take place. In most situations, it
should be easy to determine the "home" jurisdiction of a firm. For some concerns with
identifying the "home" of a domestic corporation, see Lynn M. LoPucki, Why the Debtor's
State of IncorporationShould Be the ProperPlacefor Article 9 Filing: A Systems Analysis,
79 MINN. L. REV. 577, 592-93, 633-35 (1995).
27. To keep the analysis relatively simple, I want to assume that the corporation has
substantial contacts with only France and the United States. Of course, one could easily
extend the analysis to a situation where the firm has significant contacts with a variety of
jurisdictions.
28. See generally Law No. 85-98 of January 25, 1985, J.O., January 26, 1985, p. 1097.
29. See 11 U.S.C. § 304 (1994).
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by the foreign proceeding to represent the interests of the debtor." A
Section 304 petition does not begin a full-blown bankruptcy proceeding.
Rather, it begins a "case ancillary" to the foreign proceeding.3 A case
ancillary gives the bankruptcy court the power, but not the obligation, to
stay all actions against the debtor in the United States.32 In essence, the
bankruptcy judge must decide which forum, the U.S. court or the French
court, should process the claims of the U.S. creditor. If the bankruptcy
court so decides, it can remit all of the U.S. creditors to the French proceeding.
Alternatively, the U.S. creditor could join with two other creditors
and commence an involuntary bankruptcy proceeding under Section 303
of the U. S. Bankruptcy Code.33 In such a situation, the foreign representative can move to have the case either dismissed or suspended under
Section 305.3 The requirements for dismissal or suspension under Section 305 in this instance are the same as those under Section 304 for
deciding whether to grant a foreign representative relief in an ancillary
proceeding.35 In both situations, the bankruptcy court must decide
whether, and to what extent, it will assist the foreign bankruptcy proceeding or conduct its own full-fledged bankruptcy proceeding.
Any action by the U.S. creditor to litigate its claim in this country
presumably would be based on its expectation that it will receive more
money from the debtor in the U.S. forum. If the French court promised
the creditor a greater net return on its claim, there is little reason to
believe that the U.S. creditor would seek to press its claim in the United
States. The expectation for a higher domestic return may be based on a
number of reasons. First, it may be more convenient for the U.S. creditor to litigate here rather than travelling to France. Travelling is
expensive, as is the employment of local counsel. Moreover, to the extent that any of the employees of the U.S. creditor would have to
participate in the foreign proceeding, this participation diverts their
attention from other matters. While such diversion may occur regardless
of where the litigation takes place, it is sensible to assume that the distraction will be greater if the employee has to travel to a foreign
jurisdiction. Thus, even if the U.S. and French courts offer the U.S.
creditor the same payout at the end of the proceeding, the costs involved
30. See id. § 101(24).
31. Id. § 304(a).
32. See id. § 304(b).
33. See id. § 303.
34. See id. § 305(b).
35. See id. §§ 304(b), 305 (a)(2). The one difference between these two sections is that
orders under Section 304 are appealable (see 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1994)), but those under
Section 305 are not (see 11 U.S.C. § 305(c) (1994)).
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with the foreign system may prejudice the U.S. creditor towards seeking
its remedy in the United States."
A second reason for a U.S. creditor to proceed in this country is that
there may be more assets per claim in the United States than in the enterprise as a whole. For example, assume that regardless of which
country's law applies to the creditor's claim, the creditor has a general
unsecured claim of undisputed value which will take a pro rata share of
the assets which remain after all priority claims have been paid. 7 Given
the insolvent firm's worldwide distribution of assets and claims, it may
be that the U.S. creditor will receive only five cents for each dollar it is
owed in the French proceeding. By proceeding in the United States, in
contrast, the creditor can expect either to be paid in full, if no U.S. bankruptcy petition is ever filed, or, even if a bankruptcy proceeding is
started here, to receive fifty cents on the dollar. Such a disparity might
result whenever there are more assets per dollar of claim in this country
than in the foreign jurisdiction, and whenever the creditor reasonably
expects that the U.S. proceeding will be limited to U.S. creditors chasing assets located in the United States. In this situation, it is the firm's
distribution of assets and claims rather than the content of any nation's
bankruptcy law which drives the U.S. creditor towards this country's
bankruptcy system.
A final reason for the U.S. creditor to eschew the French proceeding
is the substantive difference in the respective bankruptcy systems.3 8 It
may be that its claim is entitled to priority under U.S. bankruptcy law
but treated only as a general unsecured claim in France. For example,
the creditor may have obtained a judicial lien in this country which,
assuming that it was obtained more than ninety days before the filing of
bankruptcy and thus not subject to attack as a preference,39 would enable
the creditor to receive payment in full. The French proceeding, however,
might not recognize the validity of the judgment lien, and thus would
36. Indeed, Section 304 recognizes the inconvenience to U.S. creditors of processing
their claims in the foreign proceeding as a factor for a bankruptcy court to consider in deciding whether or not to defer to that proceeding. See 11 U.S.C. § 304(c)(2) (1994).
37. See id. § 726(a)(2), (b).
38. Areas of possible difference include different priority status and different avoidance
rules. Differences in priority status may result from the fact that one law gives special treatment to certain creditors. For example, the U.S. Bankruptcy Code gives preferential
treatment to wage claims, benefit claims, claims by grain farmers against grain elevators,
claims by U.S. fisherman against fish storage operators, consumer claims, claims for alimony
and child support, tax claims, and claims based on a commitment to a federal depository
institution's regulatory agency to maintain the capital of an insured depository institution.
See id. § 507(a). With regard to the problems created by differences in avoidance laws, see
Westbrook, supra note 9.
39. See 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1994).
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remit the creditor to unsecured status. This discussion, of course, assumes that the French court would not apply U.S. law to the claim, and
that the U.S. court would not apply French law.'
In short, a U.S. creditor will seek to avoid a foreign proceeding
when it believes that a proceeding in this country promises it a greater
return. Yet, even if the U.S. creditor believes that a single proceeding in
France would net it a higher return, it still may pursue its claim in this
country in addition to pressing a claim in France. Although the U.S.
creditor cannot hope for a double recovery on its claim," it may file a
second claim because of the following problem: if the creditor proceeds
only in France, other creditors will not be prevented from proceeding in
the United States, and as a result, it is not ensured that the assets located
in the United States will be distributed according to French law. Indeed,
as more U.S. creditors participate in the French proceeding exclusively,
the remaining U.S. creditors have an increasing incentive to proceed
under U.S. law, assuming that there is no clear commitment in U.S. law
to cooperate with the French proceeding. This situation arises because
the value of the U.S. assets are unaffected by the U.S. creditors joining
the French proceeding. As more and more U.S. creditors join the French
proceeding exclusively, there are fewer claims chasing the U.S. assets.
These remaining U.S. claims thus receive a larger payout than initially
expected. At some point, it will become rational for some U.S. creditor
to proceed in the United States. When this happens, all U.S. creditors,
including those who have filed in France, will have an incentive to file
claims in the U.S. forum. In fact, given that the first U.S. creditor making its decision as to where to process its claim can anticipate precisely
this sequence, it may as well pursue its claim in both jurisdictions initially even if it believes that it would be better off under a single French
proceeding.
Thus, when a multinational firm having substantial assets in the
United States encounters financial distress, it is all but inevitable that
some interested party, whether a creditor, the debtor, or a foreign representative, will seek the protections of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. In each
case, once the matter comes before the bankruptcy court, the judge must

40. On the general confusion surrounding the question of which preference law to apply, see Westbrook, supra note 9, at 525 (identifying five possible choice of law rules in
avoidance actions).
41. Under U.S. bankruptcy law, a creditor in a U.S. proceeding who has already recovered on its claim in the foreign proceeding will not recover until the other creditors with the
same priority have received the same value as the first creditor. See 11 U.S.C. § 508(a)
(1994). The European Convention on Certain International Aspects of Bankruptcy has a

similar provision. See Europ. T.S. No. 136, art. 5.
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decide whether to send the U.S. creditor off to France, or whether to
entertain the claim itself.
The converse situation occurs where a multinational corporation has
its home in the United States. Here, the firm files for bankruptcy protection in the United States and a foreign creditor seeks to evade the
application of U.S. bankruptcy law to its disputes with the debtor. The
foreign creditor may thus seek to have its country resolve its claim
against the debtor and seek satisfaction of such claim out of the debtor's
assets located abroad. Alternatively, the foreign creditor may either seek
to have the U.S. bankruptcy court defer to a judgment which the creditor
obtained in a foreign jurisdiction, or at least apply the law of the foreign
jurisdiction to its dispute with the debtor. The motivation for the foreign
creditor in this situation is the same as that of the U.S. creditor in the
preceding example. In short, the creditor will take the course of action
which offers the highest payout. As with the U.S. creditor, even if the
foreign creditor is quite content with its treatment under the law of the
firm's home country (the United States), it will be forced to press its
claim in both the domestic and foreign tribunals.
From the perspective of the U.S. bankruptcy court, however, the
situations are quite different. Whereas the U.S. bankruptcy court had
control over whether to defer to the foreign proceeding in the case of the
U.S. creditor seeking to avoid a foreign bankruptcy proceeding, it has
little direct control where the foreign creditor is fleeing the reach of the
U.S. Bankruptcy Code. If a foreign jurisdiction is willing to entertain
the creditor's claim and has control over sufficient assets of the debtor
to satisfy that claim, and the foreign creditor is content to press its claim
only in the foreign proceeding, then there is little that the U.S. bankruptcy court can do to protect the U.S. interests at stake. This is true
despite the declaration of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code that it applies to all
of the debtor's assets worldwide. 2 The U.S. court simply has no means by
which it can force a recalcitrant jurisdiction to cooperate with it.
To this point, we have only been considering the incentives of
creditors as to where they press their claims. Debtors have an incentive
to forum shop as well. Managers of the debtor usually control the decision when to initiate an insolvency proceeding. Different insolvency
regimes treat managers differently. For example, the default rule in
reorganization under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code is that the

42. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1994). The United States is not alone in claiming more
power than it has. See Insolvency Act, 1986, § 436 (Eng.) (asserting that the Act applies to
property "wherever situated").
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managers remain in control of the debtor's day-to-day operations.4 3
Other countries, such as England, oust managers much more readily."
Depending on whether they want to stay on or leave, the managers have
an incentive to shop for the laws which promise the best outcome for
them.
The forum shopping problem is probably less acute for debtors than
it is for creditors. For a creditor to pursue its claim in any given country,
all it needs is for there to be assets located in that country. It does not
matter to the creditor whether or not the country in question can be
considered the "home" of the debtor. The managers of the debtor are
more constrained. Simply having assets in a country with promanager
laws will not assist managers who do not reside in that country. It is
difficult to imagine a U.S. court claiming that it has the authority to
reorganize the affairs of, say, a Japanese debtor simply because the
Japanese firm has assets in the United States. It is even harder to imagine a Japanese court acceding to such an exercise of jurisdiction. For
there to be a problem of debtor forum shopping, it must be the case that
there are at least two jurisdictions which can plausibly assert that they
should be allowed to administer the affairs of the insolvent firm.
To be sure, it is possible in theory that the treatment of managers in
bankruptcy may affect managers' decision of where to locate the firm in
the first instance. One might conjecture that managers would like to
establish the firm in a jurisdiction which is manager-friendly. There are,
however, a number of problems with this suggestion. The first is that
43. See I I U.S.C. § 1107 (1994). On the favorable treatment of existing managers, see
James J. White, Harvey's Silence, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 467, 471-72 (1995); Lynn M.
LoPucki, Chapter11: An Agenda for Basic Reform, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 573,576-77 (1995)
("The United States is probably the only developed nation that leaves the debtor in unsupervised possession of the estate during a reorganization"); Rasmussen, supra note 3, at 72.
While a high percentage of managers are eventually replaced during a Chapter 11
reorganization, see id. at 72, n.79 (citing studies), this is better treatment than they would
receive either in other countries' bankruptcy systems or if the firm remained outside of

bankruptcy.
44. See Insolvency Act, 1986, § 14 (Eng.) (all management power passes to an outside
administrator). For some recent concerns over this practice, see Nick Segal, An Overview of
Recent Developments and Future Prospects in the United Kingdom, in CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW 10-12

(Jacob S. Ziegel ed., 1994). Canada also displaces its managers more readily than does the
United States. See LoPucki & Triantis, supra note 4, at 302-05. The same is true of Australia. See Ron Harmer, An Overview of Recent Developments and Future Prospects in

Australia (With Some Reference to New Zealand and Asia), in CURRENT

DEVELOPMENTS IN
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW 39, 48 (Jacob S. Ziegel

ed., 1994).

45. This was the case in the Maxwell bankruptcy where the head offices of the firm
were in England, and the majority of the assets were in the United States. See infra pp. 2930 (discussing the Maxwell bankruptcy).
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most multinational firms are domestic firms which have grown in size.
It is simply not the case that the firm had any opportunity to shop for a
favorable jurisdiction before it was incorporated. 46
Another reason why promanager bankruptcy laws will not provide
an incentive for a firm to locate in that jurisdiction is that, to the extent
that such laws are inefficient, they impose a price on the firm. Voluntary
creditors can adjust the price of their loans. To the extent that a promanager law reduces the chances of the creditor being repaid, the creditor
can raise its interest rate. If the cost of the promanager law exceeds its
benefits, the owners of the firm will not have an incentive to seek out
such a law.47
Thus, debtor forum shopping does not appear to be a serious problem. Nevertheless, given a multinational firm's worldwide dispersion of
assets and creditors, it is quite likely that in any insolvency of a multinational entity, there will be more than one bankruptcy proceeding.
B. The Problems Created by Multiple Insolvency Proceedings
Once two bankruptcy proceedings involving the same firm have begun, each bankruptcy court faces a number of decisions. In most
situations, it will be clear which country is the home of the debtor.
There is little to suggest that in such a situation, the bankruptcy court in
the home jurisdiction would allow the other bankruptcy forum to resolve
the debtor's affairs. The real question is the extent to which the other
bankruptcy forum will cooperate with the home jurisdiction. To ascertain the options available to the non-home bankruptcy forum, it is
necessary to delineate the points on which there may be conflict.
A central feature of any bankruptcy proceeding is delimiting the
debtor's assets. 4' These assets include both those owned by the debtor at
the time it files for bankruptcy, as well as those which the debtor can
recover from others through the bankruptcy process. Most bankruptcy

46. This of course differs from the domestic situation in this country, where firms are
free to incorporate wherever they wish, regardless of where their assets are located. In this
regard, it is interesting to note that while the present Bankruptcy Code allows a firm to file

for bankruptcy in the location where it is incorporated (see 28 U.S.C. § 1408 (1994)), the
Bankruptcy Commission, which was established by Congress to evaluate extant law, has
proposed eliminating this provision. For a criticism of this proposal, see Robert K. Rasmussen & Randal S. Thomas, Improving Corporate Bankruptcy Law Through Venue Reform
(November 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
47. Lynn LoPucki has argued that some voluntary creditors do not price the risks associated with their loans. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor'sBargains, 80 VA. L.
REv. 1887, 1949-63 (1994). For a response, see Rasmussen, supra note 21, at 25.
48. See Thomas H. Jackson, Translating Assets and Liabilities to the Bankruptcy Fo-

rum, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 73 (1985).
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systems allow debtors to set aside certain prebankruptcy transfers. 49 Preference law allows the debtor to void transactions that prefer a creditor at
the expense of other creditors. 0 In virtually every bankruptcy proceeding, unsecured creditors do not get paid in full. Almost all bankruptcy
systems look askance at transactions immediately prior to the filing for
bankruptcy which allow an unsecured creditor to receive payment in
full." Different countries, however, have different methods of policing
preferential transfers. For example, there is no agreement in how long
prior to bankruptcy a transfer must be before it is subject to a preference
attack. The U.S. Bankruptcy Code only scrutinizes transfers that occur
within ninety days of the filing for bankruptcy, unless the creditor was
an insider. 2 England has a four month reachback period,53 and other
M Preference
countries have differing periods."
law also varies across
jurisdictions as to whether the debtor's intent to prefer the creditor is
necessary to set aside the transaction. The U.S. Bankruptcy Code does
not require such a showing;5 other countries do. 6 It is thus not surprising that it is often the case that one country's bankruptcy regime would
treat a payment as preferential whereas another country's would not.
Preference law is not the exclusive avenue for bringing assets back
into the firm. Fraudulent conveyance law also avoids certain prebankruptcy transfers. A fraudulent conveyance occurs when the debtor
transfers property with the intent to defraud creditors or when the
debtor, while insolvent, transfers property for less than a reasonably
equivalent value. 7 Once again various jurisdictions implement the general goal of fraudulent conveyance law in different ways, leading to the
situation where one jurisdiction would set aside a transaction, where
another would not.
A second crucial aspect of any bankruptcy law is determining the
relative priority of claimants to the debtor's assets. Countries have a
49. See Westbrook, supra note 9, at 504 (noting that "[m]ost countries seem to have
rules that permit the avoidance of transactions that take place after the inception of a debtor's
financial crisis").
50. For a general discussion of preference law, see DAVID G. EPSTEIN et al.,
BANKRUPTCY § 6 (1993).

51. See Westbrook, supra note 9, at 504-05.
52. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(A) (1994). The reachback period for insiders is one year.

See id. § 547(b)(4)(B).
53. See Insolvency Act, 1986, § 240(1)(b) (Eng.).
54. Indeed, some countries have no fixed reachback period; rather, the judge determines
which prebankruptcy transactions are subject to attack. See, e.g., John A. Barrett, Jr., Mexican Insolvency Law, 7 PACE INT'L L. REv. 431,449 (1995).
55. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1994).

56. Canada, for example, requires a showing of the debtor's intent to prefer the creditor.
See Bankruptcy Act, R.S.C., ch. B-3, § 95(2) (Can.).
57. See 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1994).
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wide array of interests that they prefer. The United States, for example,
allows secured creditors first priority to the debtor's assets, up to the
value of their collateral." Other countries are not so protective." The
United States also gives a limited priority to the claims of workers for
° Other countries vary on
unpaid wages.W
this issue.6' Finally, the United
States elevates the claims of U.S. fishermen in bankruptcy proceedings
involving fish processors, grain producers in bankruptcy proceedings
involving grain storage operators, and consumers over other unsecured
creditors.62 Such claimants do not receive such favored treatment abroad.
A third component of the bankruptcy process is running the affairs
of the debtor during the bankruptcy proceeding. Issues which must be
addressed in this regard include who should be in control of the day-today decision-making process while the firm is in bankruptcy, what
should be done with executory contracts, and how should lawyers
working for the debtor be compensated.63 Again, countries take different
approaches to these issues. For example, U.S. law, absent a court order
to the contrary, leaves the current managers in charge of the debtor's
affairs while the debtor attempts to reorganize; ' if the debtor is liquidating, a trustee is appointed to handle the liquidation.65 Canada, while
generally allowing the debtor's management to remain in place, makes it
easier to displace these managers. 6 English law, at the other extreme,
allows for the appointment of an administrator who has the power to
displace the current management if he so chooses. 7
A final aspect of a bankruptcy proceeding is deciding what to do
with the firm's assets. The fundamental decision is whether the company is liquidated or reorganized. Again, countries differ in their policy
58. See id. § 725 (1994). For a recent economic-based attack on this policy, see Lucian
Ayre Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in
Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857 (1996).
59. For example, Mexican insolvency law gives workers a priority over secured creditors for wages earned one year prior to the filing for bankruptcy. See "Ley de Quiebras y de
Suspension de Pagos," D.O., 1993 art. 261 et seq. Other countries are more protective of
secured creditors in that they make it easier than the United States does for the secured party
to recover its collateral. See, e.g., R.C.C. Cuming, Canadian Bankruptcy Law: A Secured
Creditor's Heaven, in CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE
CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW 379 (Jacob S. Ziegel ed., 1994).
60. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(3) (1994).
61. See supra note 59.
62. See 11 U.S.C. § 507 (1994).
63. See, e.g., id. § 1107 (power of debtor in possession to run affairs); id. § 365
(executory contracts); id. §§ 327, 503, 507 (allowing employment of attorneys, treating their
wages as administrative expenses, and giving such expenses priority in payment).
64. See id. § 1107.
65. See id. §§ 701-02.
66. See LoPucki & Triantis, supra note 4, at 302-05.
67. See Insolvency Act, 1986, § 14(2) (Eng.).
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preference. The United States is generally perceived as having a bias
toward reorganization." It is willing to incur the cost of attempting to
reorganize an inefficient firm in order to ensure that all efficient firms
are reorganized. In other words, the United States encourages reorganization attempts, even though many attempts will fail; other countries are
less solicitous of reorganization and are more likely to liquidate firms
that file for bankruptcy.69
Given this wide divergence in the substance of various bankruptcy
regimes, different results will occur depending on which country's insolvency law will be applied. Thus, when a multinational firm
encounters financial distress and multiple insolvency proceedings have
begun, each court involved faces a basic choice: does it apply its own
law to the assets within its jurisdiction or does it cooperate to some
extent with the other bankruptcy proceeding. If the court chooses the
latter course, then it has to decide the extent of its cooperation. The
most complete form of cooperation is to simply defer to the other proceeding. Consider again the case where bankruptcy proceedings against
the same firm have been filed in both France, where the majority of the
firm's assets and managers are located, and the United States. The U.S.
court could enter a stay preventing creditors from levying on the firm's
assets located in the United States, and send all of the creditors to the
French proceeding. 0 All of the substantive decisions would be made in
France. French law would decide whether or not a transaction could be
set aside as either a preference or a fraudulent conveyance; French law
would decide the respective priorities of the various claimants; French
law would decide how to administer the estate, and French law would
decide what happens to the firm's assets. The role of the U.S. court
would be to simply ensure that the orders of the French court, to the
extent that they involve U.S. assets, are implemented.
There are, however, other, lesser levels of cooperation. Indeed, one
could imagine differing levels of cooperation in each aspect of a bankruptcy proceeding. Returning again to our French-U.S. case, consider
the question of whether or not a prebankruptcy transaction should be set

68. See sources cited supra note 3 and accompanying text.
69. See Julian R. Franks & Walter N. Torous, Lessons From a Comparison of U.S. and
U.K. Insolvency Codes, 8 OXFORD REV. OF ECON. POL'Y 70 (1993); Michelle J. White, The
Costs of Corporate Bankruptcy: A U.S.-European Comparison, in CORPORATE BANK-

RUPTCY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 467 (Jagdeep S. Bhandari & Lawrence E.
Weiss eds., 1996).
70. See In re Axona Int'l Credit & Commerce Ltd., 88 B.R. 597, 618 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1988), aff'd, 115 B.R. 442 (S.D.N.Y 1990), appeal dismissed, 924 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1991)

(transferring assets to home country proceeding in Hong Kong).
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aside as a preference." The U.S. court could attempt to engage in a
choice of law analysis to determine which country's law should apply to
the transaction at issue, it could apply the law of the jurisdiction in
which the assets are located at the time bankruptcy petition is filed, it
could hold that the transaction should be avoidable if the law of either
France or the United States would set it aside, or it could hold that the
transaction would be avoidable only if the law of both the United States
and France would set it aside." If the U.S. court, using one of these
decision rules, decides that the transaction should be set aside, it then
"cooperates" with the French court by sending the recovered assets to
France for distribution according to French priority rules.
One can easily imagine other amalgams of applying U.S. and
French law which would still be deemed cooperation. For example, if
there is no attempt in either France or the United States to reorganize
the company, the U.S. court could supervise the liquidation of the U.S.
assets, and remit the proceeds to the French proceeding. In short, cooperation can entail any number of possible actions. On each issue of
substantive bankruptcy law, the U.S. court is faced with the question of
applying its own law or deferring to French law. While it is easy to
identify total cooperation-send the entire proceeding to France-and
total noncooperation-pretend that France does not exist, there is a
broad range of actions that a court can take which can easily be labeled
either cooperation or noncooperation.
The easiest way to address these myriad problems is to ignore them.
Indeed, this has been the approach that most countries have followed .
Generally, the courts of each country administer the insolvent firm's
assets located within its borders according to its own laws without any
regard to the firm's assets located elsewhere. This approach to transnational bankruptcies has come to be known as the "territorial approach,"
or, more derisively, as the "grab rule." 74
The opposite of the territorial approach is the "universal approach,"
of which there are a number of versions. In its most pristine form, the
universal approach endorses a single bankruptcy law which would apply
to all firms regardless of location." It is thus accurate to call this approach "substantive universalism." Whereas the territorial approach
ignores the problem caused by multiple jurisdictions, the substantive
71. For a detailed analysis of this problem, see Westbrook, supra note 9.
72. See id. at 525.
73. See Westbrook, supra note 8, at 460; Nadelmann, supra note 8; Barbara K. Under,
United States Recognition of Foreign Bankruptcies, 19 INT'L LAW. 1153, 1154-55 (1985).

74. See sources cited supra note 8.
75. See Gaa, supra note 20, at 906-09; Honsberger, supra note 20, at 633-34; Westbrook, supra note 9, at 514-15.
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universal approach eliminates the problem by eliminating the multiple
proceedings with their differing sets of insolvency rules.
A variation of this approach, also referred to as "universal" in the
academic literature and most often endorsed by commentators, is for all
countries to adopt the rule that every transnational bankruptcy be handled in the "home" jurisdiction of the multinational firm, with the courts
of other countries acting as ancillaries to assist the primary court. Unlike the more pristine form of universalism which has a single set of
insolvency rules for all multinational firms, this form of universalism
requires the home country to apply its domestic insolvency law to the
multinational debtor.7 7 Thus, one can call this approach "procedural
universalism."
A more tempered version of the procedural universal approachcalled "modified universalism" 7s-advocates a system with more limited
cooperation. It retains the general goal of procedural universalism of a
single proceeding, usually in the firm's home country, by giving bankruptcy courts the power to defer to foreign proceedings. However, it
departs from pure procedural universalism in that it provides local bankruptcy courts with the discretion not to cooperate with the home
jurisdiction if it deems that jurisdiction's laws unfair to local creditors 9
Under this approach, the bankruptcy judge, when faced with a transnational insolvency, decides on a case-by-case basis whether to cooperate
with the foreign proceeding. The U.S. Bankruptcy Code, in Section 304,
currently adopts this approach.80
By and large, academics have embraced the universal approach; in
particular, they endorse procedural universalism." The argument on
which they rely, however, applies to all types of universalism. That
argument is that universalism increases social welfare. 2 One source of
this increase is that universalism provides creditors with a clear set of
rules, which allows them to price their loans more accurately. If creditors do not know which set of insolvency rules apply, they will raise
their interest rates to compensate for this uncertainty. 3 This increase in
interest rates without a corresponding benefit is a net social loss.

76. See Westbrook, supra note 9, at 515.

77. See id. at 517-18.
78. This is Westbrook's term. See id. at 517.
79. See id.
80. See 11 U.S.C. § 304 (1994).

81. See Bebchuk & Guzmdn, supra note 19; Westbrook, supra note 8; Todd Kraft & Allison Aranson, TransnationalBankruptcies: Section 304 and Beyond, COLUM. Bus. L. REv.

329 (1993).
82. See Westbrook, supra note 8, at 464-66.
83. See id. at 466.
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Proponents of universalism posit other savings as well. One is in the
area of administrative costs. Under a universal regime, there need only
be one main proceeding instead of several. This decrease in the number
of forums, it is argued, will reduce the overall cost of the bankruptcy
proceeding." There will be fewer attorneys needed, and issues resolved
in one forum will not need to be relitigated in another. Even if one propounds a universal regime which entails the use of ancillary courts in
countries other than the debtor's home jurisdiction, there will still be
administrative savings. While parties may have to hire counsel to represent them in both the main and ancillary proceedings, the amount of
litigation handled by the ancillary proceedings will be less than it currently is under the territorial system.
Furthermore, the proponents of universalism argue that it increases
the value of the debtor's assets, regardless of whether the firm is reorganized or liquidated.85 A successful reorganization depends on keeping
assets spread across various countries in the firm. 6 This is more likely to
occur under a single set of insolvency rules than if each country applies
its own insolvency rules to the assets within its borders.87 Conversely, if
the firm is going to be liquidated, a single proceeding will allow the
seller to package the assets in a way that maximizes their value."8
Lucian Bebchuk and Andrew Guzm6.n have recently put forth a new
argument in favor of the universal approach.89 Bebchuk and Guzmdn
examine the effect that the territorial approach has on investment decisions prior to the onset of financial distress. Their basic claim is that the
territorial rule can skew investment choice. They posit a situation where
a firm has existing debt and assets in a single country. The firm is then
faced with the choice of making a new investment in either this first
country or a new country. In their model, the new country's bankruptcy
law would give priority to this new debt, whereas the existing country's
bankruptcy law would not. In this situation, the firm may make the
investment in the new country even though such investment is inefficient. The driving force behind this result is that the firm, by issuing
84. See Daniel M. Glosband & Christopher T. Katucki, Claims and Priorities in Ancillary Proceedings Under Section 304, 17 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 477, 481 (1991) ("Territoriality

not only sacrifices international cooperation but also necessitates the cost and inefficiency of
a full bankruptcy proceeding in each country that houses assets.").
85. See Westbrook, supra note 8, at 460.
86. Regarding the general need to keep assets together for a successful reorganization,
see JACKSON, supra note 21, at 7-19.
87. Cf.Westbrook, supra note 8, at 481 ("[territoriality] encourages a race to the courthouse of countries housing assets..."); Warren, The Untenable Case for Repeal of Chapter
11, supra note 3, at 350-52 (race to courthouse destroys a firm's value).

88. See Westbrook, supra note 8, at 465-66.
89. See Bebchuk & Guzmn, supra note 19.
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new debt with a higher priority than the existing debt, is able to place
some of the downside risk of the project on the existing debtholders. 90
Central to their analysis is the assumption that the new country and the
old country differ on the priority level accorded to the new debt. Based
on this scenario, they conclude that the territorial approach to international insolvency creates the possibility of inefficient investment as
compared to the universal approach.
II. THE OPTIMAL SOLUTION TO THE TRANSNATIONAL
BANKRUPTCY PROBLEM

Perhaps the most striking feature of the arguments in favor of universalism is their almost complete disregard for the substance of the
bankruptcy law which is to be applied. Those who argue for a single set
of rules to cover multinational bankruptcy, the substantive universalist
approach, make no effort to even adumbrate the content of such a universal regime. 9' Such a deficit undermines the force of their arguments.
One can readily admit that there may be gains to be had by having a
single proceeding or a set of clear rules designating one, among possible
forums, as the principal forum, but still conclude that the costs associated with that regime outweigh the benefits of avoiding current practice.
To be a bit extreme, one can imagine a controlling rule which resolves
all contested disputes by trial-by-battle. The costs of judicial administration are low, but the error costs of the proceeding itself are quite
high. One cannot thus endorse the concept of having a single set of
bankruptcy rules for an insolvent company without saying something
about the content of those rules.
The same problem bedevils those who argue for a single forum
which applies its domestic bankruptcy law to the multinational firm,
they simply take existing domestic law as a given. There is no attempt
to ascertain the efficacy of this law.92 This renders their arguments
incomplete. The gains foreseen are attributable to having a bankruptcy
proceeding in a single forum pursuant to a single set of insolvency
rules. 93 Yet, if that forum has an inefficient law, the gains may be lost. To
90. This problem with issuing priority debt has been well discussed in the domestic
context. See George G. Triantis, Secured Debt Under Conditions of Imperfect Information,
21 J. LEGAL STUD. 225, 236 (1992).

91. See sources cited supra note 20.
92. The proponents of modified universalism, however, do acknowledge a need to look
at the substance of forum law. They contend that a U.S. bankruptcy court should defer to a
foreign proceeding only when the foreign law is similar to U.S. law. See Westbrook, supra

note 8. They make no effort, however, to define what constitutes "close enough."
93. See id. at 461-71.
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complete the case for universalism, one must examine the substance of
the law to be applied. Universalism will remain fatally incomplete until
the content of the law to be applied is specified.
There is, however, a deeper conceptual error imbedded in the argument for universalism, in both its substantive and procedural forms.
Both implicitly assume that governments dictate the applicable bankruptcy rules. This assumption should be abandoned because imposing a
single rule on firms will be inefficient compared with a system permitting a debtor to choose the law governing its bankruptcy. 94 The general
thrust of the argument is one of comparative advantage. The possibility
that a firm may encounter financial distress is known to all who voluntarily deal with the firm. Lenders decide the terms of loans based on the
possibility of repayment. 9 Bankruptcy rules determine payouts when the
firm encounters financial distress, and thus form part of the calculus
when lenders make lending decisions. Lenders in a competitive market
price their loans so as to receive, on an expected basis, the competitive
rate of return." This being the case, the firm ultimately pays the price
for inefficient bankruptcy rules through the form of higher interest rates.
There are two institutions which are potential candidates for selecting the insolvency rules that help determine the price of loans: the
market, represented by the owners of firms, and the government, represented by the legislature. 97 Here, firms have an advantage over the
government because they can ascertain the price of different insolvency
rules through the market. They observe the different interest rates charged
by lenders for differing sets of insolvency rules, and can compare these
94; See Barry E. Adler, Finance's Theoretical Divide and the ProperRole of Insolvency

Rules, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 1107 (1994); Rasmussen, supra note 3, at 78-100; Schwartz,
Contracting About Bankruptcy, supra note 23, at 129. Even those who argue that Chapter 11
may be efficient do not necessarily endorse the notion that firms should not be able to contract out of it. See Randal C. Picker, Voluntary Petitions and the Creditors' Bargain, 61 U.

CNN. L. REv. 519, 522 n.16 (1992).
95. See Rasmussen, supra note 3, at 57-58; William H. Meckling, FinancialMarkets,
Default, and Bankruptcy: The Role of the State, 41 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. Autumn 1977,
at 13, 21, n.19; Frank H. Easterbrook, Is Corporate Bankruptcy Efficient, 27 J. FIN. ECON.
411,414 (1990).

96. See Rasmussen, supra note 3, at 57-58, n.15; Meckling, supra note 95, at 21.
97. A possible institution for generating bankruptcy rules is a private body such as a
trade organization or a group charged with formulating such laws. In the domestic setting,
the most prominent of these is the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws. In the international bankruptcy context, INSOL International played a large role in the
drafting of the proposed model law on transnational insolvencies. See supra note 18. On the
problems that can arise in such private bodies, see Edward L. Rubin, Thinking Like a Lawyer
Acting Like a Lobbyist. Some Notes on the Process of Revising UCC Articles 3 and 4, 26
Loy. L.A. L. REv. 743 (1993); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of
Private Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 595 (1995). These private bodies can either produce

proposed legislation for governments to enact or standard forms for private parties to adopt.
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differing costs to the benefits of competing insolvency rules. Firms can
then select the set of rules which provides the highest net return."
The government, in contrast, has no particular insight to either the
cost of any given set of rules that it may choose to enact nor to the benefits that those rules bring.9 Legislatures have no process to ascertain the
market's pricing of the rules it enacts, nor can it determine the value of
its rules to those affected by them. Legislatures are thus in a worse position than are firms to engage in the cost-benefit analysis critical to
assessing the efficiency of a given set of insolvency rules. Firms may
not inevitably make the optimal selection in every instance; on balance,
however, they should perform better than the legislature.m
A second reason also favors the market over the government in deciding which insolvency rules should apply. Legislatures, by their
nature, pass rules which cover a broad class of entities. They operate on
a categorical basis; they simply cannot make individualized determinations. The market, on the other hand, can offer a variety of alternatives
which allows a party to select the most suitable one for its needs. Thus,
if firms differ as to which set of insolvency rules prove optimal, a market solution will more likely produce optimal diversity than a
legislatively mandated one.'0 ' In short, the simple argument for a general
regime of freedom of contractual choice applies to the bankruptcy
2
context as well as it does to other commercial and corporate contexts.1
There are, of course, limits to this sweeping argument. Some creditors of a firm do not choose to transact with the firm. Rather, the firm
through its actions makes these persons creditors. The most obvious
example of this is a firm's tort creditors.' 3 If firms were allowed to
98. This discussion assumes that efficiency is the appropriate criterion for assessing
bankruptcy law. For a defense of this position, see Rasmussen, supra note 21.
99. The shortcomings discussed in this paragraph are also evident in the private lawmaking bodies mentioned in note 97.
100. On the necessity of identifying the better institution, rather than comparing a single institution to a perfect world, see NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES:
CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS N LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994); OLIVER E.
WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 15-42 (1985).
101. Markets do not always provide optimal diversity. See Michael Klausner, Corpora-

tions, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757 (1995); Marcel Kahan
& Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or "The
Economics of Boilerplate"), 83 VA. L. REV. 713 (1997).
102. For the general argument as to why contractual freedom should be the norm in the
corporate context, see FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAw 1-39 (1991); Symposium, ContractualFreedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLuM. L. REV. 1395 (1989).
103. The other significant category of involuntary claimant is the government, which is
generally owed taxes by a failing firm. See Douglas G. Baird, The Reorganization of Closely
Held Firms and the "Opt Out" Problem, 72 WASH U. L.Q. 913, 915 (1994); LoPucki, supra

note 47, at 1897.
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dictate the treatment of these creditors in bankruptcy, one would expect
that these creditors would not fare well. For this reason, advocates of
contractual freedom in the bankruptcy context also argue that government should determine the priority status of involuntary creditors.'" As
to the level of that priority, most prioritize tort claimants over all voluntary creditors."
Despite this agreement on basic principles, those advocating an
economic approach to bankruptcy disagree as to the best way to implement those principles. The general debate is whether the government
should supply a set of nonexclusive legal regimes, from which the firm
can choose at the time of its formation, or whether government should
exit the insolvency context entirely and leave the matter to private contract. °) Both proposals replace a bankruptcy system mandated by the
government with one chosen by those whose money is at stake. They
differ crucially not so much on whether either constrains private
choice-under each the only constraint is the treatment of involuntary
creditors-but on whether the government can reduce the transaction
costs associated with determining the possible alternative rules.
On balance, it is preferable to have a menu of options available for
firms at the formation stage rather than a single default rule of simply
enforcing private contracts. To understand why, the costs associated
with a single default rule must be evaluated. Under traditional economic
analysis of corporate law, the virtue of default rules is that firms can
decide whether the default rule maximizes firm value, and if it does not,
choose a better rule at a relatively low cost.'1 To the extent firm owners
have an incentive to select rules that maximize firm value, this action
will maximize social welfare. °s

104. See Adler, supra note 21, at 339-40; Rasmussen, supra note 3, at 67; Schwartz,
ContractingAbout Bankruptcy, supra note 23, at 142 n.28.
105. See Adler, supra note 21, at 340; David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors,91 COLUM. L. REV. 1565 (1991); LoPucki, supra note 47, at 1907-16;
Rasmussen, supra note 21, at 31-35.
106. Compare Rasmussen, supra note 3; Robert K. Rasmussen, The Ex Ante Effects of
Bankruptcy Reform on Investment Incentives, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1159 (1994); Robert K.
Rasmussen & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Economic Analysis of Corporate Bankruptcy Law, 3
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 85 (1995); and Schwartz, ContractingAbout Bankruptcy, supra
note 23, at 144; with Adler, supra note 21; Adler, supra note 94; Bradley & Rosenzweig,
supra note 3.
107. The classic statement of this rule is found in EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra
note 102, at 1-39.
108. For the best articulation of this position, see id. at 1-39. Given the ease with which
corporations can opt out of the default rule, Bernie Black has asserted that the role of corporate law is minimal. See Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and
EconomicAnalysis, 84 NW. U.L. REV. 542 (1990).
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Recent work, borrowing from the economic literature on network
externalities, questions this simple proposition.' °9 A network externality
in the product area exists where the value of the product depends on the
number of persons using the product." ° For example, part of the value of
having an IBM-compatible personal computer is that many other people
own them, thus creating a market for software and hardware. Michael
Klausner has shown that when the value of a default rule to a firm turns
on how many other firms have adopted it, the choice made by a single
firm whether to adopt or depart from that rule may not be socially optimal."' At times, all firms may adopt the default rule, even if social
welfare would be improved by having a diversity of rules. At other
times, all firms may choose not to follow the default rule, and select
their own customized rule, even if there is a single rule which, if
adopted by all firms, would increase social welfare. In such situations,
efficiency can be improved by having a menu of options from which
firms can select the best bankruptcy rule, rather than having a single
default rule."'
While a detailed analysis of the network externalities problem in the
bankruptcy context is beyond the scope of this article, such externalities
do exist, thus lending support for the menu approach. A single set of
insolvency rules would not be optimal for every firm. Yet, if there was a
single default rule, it may be that network effects would lead to a "lockin" effect where all firms adopted this single rule. The sources of these
network externalities include legal service externalities and marketing
externalities."'
Legal service externalities exist where lawyers are familiar with the
default rule, and this familiarity creates an incentive for clients to adhere
109. See Klausner, supra note 101, at 758-59; Kahan & Klausner, supra note 101.
110. Work in this area includes Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Installed Base and
Compatibility: Innovation, Product Preannouncements,and Predation, 76 AM. ECON. REV.
940 (1986); Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Standardization,Compatibility,and Innovation,
16 RAND. J. ECON. 70 (1985); Michael Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424 (1985); Michael Katz & Carl Shapiro,

Systems Competition and Network Effects, 8 J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1994, at 93.
111. See Klausner, supra note 101.
112. See id. at 839-41. I have elsewhere argued that having a menu increases efficiency
as opposed to leaving the matter to private contract. See Rasmussen, supra note 3, at 62-68.
Ian Ayres has also suggested that legislatures provide menus for corporate contracts. See Ian
Ayres, Making a Difference: The Contractual Contributions of Easterbrookand Fischel, 59
U. CHI. L. REV. 1391, 1416 (1992).
113. The types of network externalities identified by Klausner are interpretive network
externalities, common practice network externalities, legal services network externalities,
marketing network externalities, and learning effects. See Klausner, supra note 101, at 77489. Only the last two types of network externalities exist in the contract for bankruptcy
context. Klausner himself notes that network externalities may inform the current bankruptcy
debate. Id. at 766, n. 25.
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to that rule."' Once lawyers are familiar with particular contractual
terms, it costs the client more in legal fees to have a new contract with
new language and new terms drafted. In the bankruptcy context, there
are a number of potentially complicated issues whose resolution both
requires elaborate drafting and permits many alternative terms, as the
current morass of international bankruptcy law illustrates. Given a default rule of enforcing private contracts, there will be a cost advantage
for the firm at the front end in choosing the existing terms rather than
attempting to customize a set of bankruptcy rules for the firm. This
savings in costs could lead a firm to adopt the default rule even though a
different rule would maximize firm value.
A similar externality exists in the marketing area. Firms need investors, both at the stage when they first form, and when they first go
public. These investors must evaluate the product that they are buying.
To the extent there is a well-used default rule, the investors will be familiar with the costs and benefits of the rule.'15 If a firm decides to adopt
a customized set of bankruptcy rules, however, investors will have to
spend resources to ascertain the costs and benefits of the unfamiliar
customized rules. The same holds true for all subsequent creditors, who
will also price the cost of having to learn any unfamiliar term.' 6 Once
again, there are cost savings for firms adopting the existing default rule
instead of attempting to craft a rule which better suits the needs of the
firm.
These costs can be ameliorated by having a menu of options from
which firms can select. By having a number of publicly disseminated
insolvency rules, lawyers will gain expertise with each set of rules." 7
Thus, as amongst the rules, there will be little or no legal service externalities. Lawyers will be conversant with the various choices available
to firms, and thus should charge roughly the same amount for each of
the available choices. Only if the firm decides to craft a set of insolvency rules that departs from the choices on the menu will there be legal
service externalities. Thus, to the extent that a well-crafted set of options can cover the needs of a large majority of firms, the problems
associated with legal services externalities would be greatly reduced.
Adopting a menu of insolvency options would also decrease marketing externalities. Those deciding to invest money in the firm, either
by taking an equity stake or by extending credit, would be familiar with
114. See id. at 782-84.

115. See id. at 785-86.
116. See Rasmussen, supra note 3, at 65-67.
117. Of course, there is an optimal number of rules. At some point, the gain attributable
to adding another rule to the menu is outweighed by the cost of having to learn the details of
that rule. See id. at 100.
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the various options on the menu. To be sure, these investors will charge
differing rates depending on how they are treated under the differing
options. Yet, because they are already familiar with these options, there
will be no charge for the added cost of learning an entirely new set of
insolvency rules. By shifting from a single default rule to a menu of
options, the marketing externalities would be reduced significantly.
Once it is decided that a menu of options would be superior to a
single default rule, one still must face the question whether the market
can provide such a menu by creating standard forms or whether the
government should layout the menu options. Despite the general effectiveness of market solutions to bankruptcy problems, " g in this area, the
government can probably do a better job. The network externalities that
exist under a single default rule would prevent the market from forming
the standard forms necessary to create a well-functioning menu regime.
Even if one law firm decided to invest resources to create a set of standard forms, it is unlikely that a firm would choose one of these forms
rather than the default rule. The default rule has an installed base of
interpretation; other lawyers know how courts have interpreted the rule.
Such a base of interpretation does not exist with respect to the privately
generated forms. Also, those who invest money in the firm know the
contours of the default rule; they would have to spend additional resources to determine the contours of the insolvency rules drafted by the
law firm. It is these very problems which doom the default rule approach. " 9 Only if the law firm were able to draft a set of insolvency
rules whose efficiency gains exceeded these network externalities would
a firm have an incentive to deviate from the default rule. The government's comparative advantage in publicizing its menu leads to the
conclusion that the government, rather than the market, should craft the
menu of bankruptcy options.
This argument gains force when one moves from the domestic context to the international one. Countries differ in their legal traditions and
in their languages. When a firm departs from the default rule to craft its
own insolvency regime, there is greater potential for misunderstanding
the import of this regime when a foreign court may be called upon to
interpret its provisions. Similarly, foreign investors may face a higher
cost in learning the tailor-made rules than would domestic investors.

118. See generally Rasmussen, supra note 3; Rasmussen & Skeel, supra note 106, at
91-96.
119 Kahan and Klausner's recent study of contracting in the bond market supports the
conclusion that law firms are not well situated to provide alternatives to the governing
default rule. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 101, at 753-56.
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Thus, the network externalities discussed above increase when one
moves from the national to the international arena.'20
A menu approach to international insolvency law thus promises significant efficiency gains over any system which either imposes a single
regime or sets one such regime as a default rule. For this reason, it is
preferable both to the current situation, in which each country applies its
own set of mandatory insolvency laws to the assets of the debtor found
within its borders, and to proposed systems of substantive universality.
The task of crafting the options which should appear on the menu remains. The article's goal is not to specify the contours of the optimal
menu,' but to change the direction of the debate over international
bankruptcy law from the question of which mandatory rule should apply
to the insolvent multinational firms to the question of which set of insolvency rules should be offered to multinational firms. Firm choice
should replace government mandate.

III. SECOND-BEST SOLUTIONS

Adopting the menu-based solution to the problem of transnational
bankruptcies would require a fundamental shift in the way countries
approach this problem. Most other proposed reforms urge more incremental changes in extant law. The preference of most, if not all,
academic commentators would be a meta-rule that the "home" country
of the multinational firm provide the single forum, and controlling law,
for handling all transnational bankruptcies. This part shows that such a
meta-rule is not obviously preferable to the current system. This part
then proposes a new approach to transnational insolvencies which is not
a radical departure from current law. This approach would allow firms
to select which country's laws would govern in the case of financial
distress. While I do not claim that the latter procedure is ideal, it represents an improvement to the current state of affairs, while remaining
within the confines of existing legal doctrine.
120. Implementation of this menu approach would best be done through a treaty among

nations specifying the choices on the menu. While one could certainly imagine individual
countries setting up their own menus which both detail specific options and validate any
other choice made by the parties, this would more than likely lead to a large number of

differing options as each country added more to the list. While current efforts to draft international insolvency treaties have been less than successful, one would imagine that it is
easier to reach agreement on what acceptable options would be rather than agree on a single,
universal procedure. Indeed, the recently drafted model law by UNCITL and INSOL avoids
attempting to specify a single insolvency regime. See supra note 18.
121. For a proposed menu for domestic firms, see Rasmussen, supra note 3, at 100-21.
122. See Westbrook, supra note 9, at 517-18.
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A. The "Home" JurisdictionApproach
Procedural universality calls for a set of rules designed to ensure
that a single forum handles the financial distress of a transnational firm.
This forum would apply its own bankruptcy rules, including its own
choice of law rules.' Scholars advocating this approach to transnational
insolvencies generally agree that the best rule would
be for the firm's
24
"home" country to administer all the debtor's assets.
This proposal may not achieve the results attributed to it, however.
Recall that the case for universalism relies on efficiency grounds: clear
rules decrease lending costs and do not skew investment choices, and a
single forum provides a number of administrative savings.'21 Yet for
some firms, the current territorial approach may produce more efficient
results than this alternative.
The driving force behind the argument for procedural universality is
that it prevents a destructive race to the firm's assets. But it is not always
true that the international setting provides a theater for a calamitous race
to the assets. In this regard, the parallel argument long invoked to explain
the need for domestic bankruptcy law, both by law and economic bankruptcy scholars' 26 and by more traditional bankruptcy scholars, 127 proves to

be an inapt analogy. The domestic argument proceeds from the premise
that state debt collection law allows individual creditors to carve up the
firm by receiving judicial liens and levying on the debtor's property to
satisfy these liens. No state has a commonly used collective debt collection mechanism. It only provides individual remedies." Permitting
individual creditors to pursue their state-law remedies leads to a number
of inefficient results, including the piecemeal sale of the assets of the firm
which may be worth more if kept together; excessive monitoring by individual creditors to ensure they are not last in line once the race to the
assets begins; and numerous judicial proceedings as each creditor rushes
to its preferred forum.'29 These concerns do not apply in the international
context, since most nations have some form of bankruptcy law which will
end the destructive race to the assets in that country. For example, Section
362 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code stays all debt collection efforts and

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

See Westbrook, supra note 8, at 461-7 1.
See id.
Bebchuk & Guzmln, supra note 19; Westbrook, supra note 8.
See JACKSON, supra note 21, at 7-19.
See Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World, supra note 3, at

350-52.
128. See Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHi. L. REv. 775, 782-85 (1987).
129. See Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements and the
Creditors'Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857, 860-68 (1982).
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forces the creditors into a collective proceeding."" Thus, there is no threat
of a destructive race inside the borders of any country.
To be sure, the affairs of a transnational corporation extend beyond
the jurisdiction of a single sovereign. Yet in many cases, having the
assets in each country administered separately does not raise the specter
of inefficient deployment of those assets. Consider in this regard the
recent insolvency of Olympia & York, which was primarily engaged in
developing commercial property in various countries. 3 ' It is hard to see
why allowing each country to administer the property within its borders
would lead to inefficient deployment, since there is no synergy amongst
the differing assets. How the firm's London assets are deployed has no
effect on the management of the firm's Canadian properties. Thus, even
if individual creditors induced each country to administer the local assets under its own bankruptcy law, it is difficult to imagine that such a
piecemeal resolution of Olympia & York's financial distress would have
caused a large loss in terms of social welfare. Only an unquestioned
belief in the value of international cooperation would lead to the conclusion that the lack of cooperation in Olympia & York is a cause for
32
concern.
Consider also the case of U.S. Lines, a major ocean carrier that filed
for Chapter 11 reorganization under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.' 3' Even
though no one disputed that the United States was the home jurisdiction,
most courts outside the United States refused to defer to the U.S. bankruptcy court.' For shipping lines, firm assets usually are spread all over
the world. Is it the case, however, that the assets of a shipping line are
worth more than the sum of their parts? Presumably, when each country
allowed its home creditors to seize the ships within its jurisdiction, these
ships were not sent to the scrap yard. These ships are most likely still
plowing through international waters.'" There may have been an end to
the firm U.S. Lines, but there may not have been a loss of a going-concern

130. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1994).
131. In re Olympia & York Developments Ltd. [1993] 12 O.R. 3d 500 (Ont. Gen. Div.).
132. See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Developments in TransnationalBankruptcy, 39 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 745, 745-46 (1995).
133. Felixstowe Deck & Railing Co. v. U.S. Lines, 2 Lloyd's Rep. 76 (1987). See Stefan
A. Riesenfeld, TransnationalBankruptcies in the Late Eighties: A Tale of Evolution and Atavism, in COMPARATIVE AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JOHN HENRY
MERRYMAN ON HIS SEvENTETH BIRT-DAY 409,416 (David S. Clark ed., 1990).

134. See Westbrook, supra note 8, at 479.
135. Of course even if some ships were taken out of service, proponents of cooperation
would still have to demonstrate that this course of action was inefficient. Industries often
suffer from overcapacity, and liquidation of one firm is one avenue toward reducing the
excess supply.
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surplus. However, at least one prominent commentator has pointed to this
case as an example of the ills caused by a lack of cooperation. 3 '
The presence of a bankruptcy system in each country also reduces
the other evils identified with the domestic race to the assets. Because
there will only be a single proceeding in each country, the fear of a
different proceeding for each creditor is reduced. To be sure, there still
may be additional expenses than if there was only one proceeding
worldwide. The debtor will need counsel in each of the proceedings.
Also, some creditors may pursue the debtor in all available forums,
thereby increasing costs. On the other hand, some creditors, such as a
bank which takes a security interest in all of the firm's domestic assets,
may only participate in a single proceeding in its home country, thus
eliminating the need for counsel abroad. Thus, the existence of multiple
proceedings under the current territoriality approach may reduce the
costs to some firms but increase them for others.
The remaining argument in favor of universalism is that offered by
Bebchuk and Guzmdn. Recall that they assert that territoriality skews
investment decisions in a way that universalism does not. The linchpin
of their analysis is the assumption that each country's law will favor that
country's creditors over foreign creditors. It is this favoritism that, in
their model, allows a firm to obtain a lower interest rate by investing in
a new country which will elevate the claims of its domestic creditors
over the claims of the firm's existing creditors. Absent such favoritism,
the territorial approach will not affect investment choice.'37 The question
of recognition of foreign creditors, however, is distinct from the question of which forum or forums should handle the financial distress of a
multinational firm. Few, if any, argue that foreign creditors should be
treated differently from domestic creditors based solely on their nationality. Indeed, most countries today accord national treatment to foreign
creditors. 3 Thus, while the argument of Bebchuk and Guzmdn is analytically sound, it is an argument for national treatment of creditors
(which most countries practice) rather than an argument for universalism (which most countries eschew). It is thus still the case that, on an a
priori basis, one cannot maintain that universalism dominates territoriality for all firms.
To say that procedural universality will not generate more efficient
results in every case, is not to say, however, that it will not generate
efficient results in any case. For example, consider the case where multiple proceedings lead to the liquidation of a firm that otherwise would
136. See Westbrook, supra note 8, at 478-83.
137. See Bebchuk & Guzmdn, supra note 19, at 12-13.
138. See Westbrook, supra note 131, at 755.
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have and should have remained intact. In what circumstances would this
be the case? First, there would have to be a firm which is worth more as
a going concern than it would be if it were liquidated piecemeal. Second, the firm's operations would have to be so integrated that a single
forum was necessary to revamp the firm's capital structure. The recent
Maxwell bankruptcy may have been such a case.
Maxwell Communication Corporation (MCC) was an English
holding company with more than 400 subsidiaries worldwide. 9 The
managers of MCC filed a petition in the Southern District of New York
under Chapter 11, which provides better treatment for incumbent managers than does the English Insolvency Act. The following day, the
managers also obtained an order in London putting the firm into administration under the Insolvency Act. There were thus two primary
proceedings involving MCC.
Given the nature of MCC, there is reason to believe that there was
value in keeping the firm in its current configuration. The managers of
the firm, who presumably had expertise in handling MCC's business,
were located in England. The majority of the assets, however, were
located in the United States. Supposing that the managers of MCC were
in the best position to maximize the return on these assets, the assets
"needed" these managers to achieve their highest value. To the extent
that the managers' business ability was to some extent firm specific,
they likewise needed the assets to maximize their value. The two insolvency proceedings, however, raised the possibility that the U.S. assets
would be administered separately from the English managers and thus
much of the value of the overall enterprise would be lost.
Despite the fact that neither England nor the United States has embraced procedural universality, the English and U.S. courts and attorneys
were able to approximate it through their own agreements so as to avoid a
piecemeal handling of MCC. The U.S. Bankruptcy Court refused to dismiss MCC's Chapter 11 petition, and instead appointed an examiner with
expanded powers.' 40 The High Court appointed as administrators insolvency practioners suggested by MCC's major bank creditors. 4 ' The
examiner and the administrators then drafted an "Order and Protocol."
This document, which was approved by both the Bankruptcy Court and
the High Court, set forth the ground rules for the two insolvency
139. See Evan D. Flaschen & Ronald J. Silverman, The Role of the Examiner as Facilitator and Harmonizer in the Maxwell Communication Corporation International
Insolvency, in CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE CORPORATE

LAW 621, 624 (Jacob S. Ziegel ed., 1994).
140. See In re Maxwell Communication Corp., 170 B.R. 800 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994),
aff'd, 186 B.R. 807 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
141. See Flaschen & Silverman, supra note 139, at 624.
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procedings. This document in essence attempted to harmonize the two
competing insolvency systems into a single regime. The examiner and the
administrators agreed that MCC's Chapter 11 plan and the Administration
in England would provide for essentially the same treatment of MCC and
its subsidiaries. The parties also agreed that MCC's assets outside of the
United States and England should be sold quickly.4 1 In effect, the two
parties negotiated a bankruptcy treaty for this case.
These facts suggest that all of the parties involved in the MCC bankruptcy believed the firm was worth more with its English and U.S. assets
combined. As a result, both the examiner and the administrators spent
considerable resources in harmonizing the U.S. and English proceedings. Even where significant barriers exist, cooperation designed to
achieve universality does occur when there are clear gains.
Which is the more common situation, Olympia & York or Maxwell?
In other words, how often is a multinational company's operations so
integrated that applying different insolvency laws threatens the efficient
deployment of the firm's assets? Ultimately, this is an empirical question, to which the answer is changing constantly. Although MCC is, by
all accounts, a highly unusual case in that the managers were located in
one country and the majority of the assets in another, 43 the trend is toward more integrated transnational operations.1 " What is clear, however,
is that the threat of inefficiently tearing apart a firm is not necessarily as
large as is assumed in the standard arguments against the territorial
approach. The simple equation between the domestic and international
contexts on which the case for procedural universalism is normally
based cannot withstand scrutiny.
Even if the territorial approach does not lead to the routine liquidation of economically efficient companies, one might be tempted to argue
that it nevertheless raises the costs of liquidation when compared with
the procedural universalism approach. But the threat of excessive
creditor monitoring, which Thomas Jackson points to in justifying domestic bankruptcy law,' 5 does not loom large in the international
context. The reason for this reduction is, again, each jurisdiction has its
own set of bankruptcy laws. To the extent that the bankruptcy law of a

country embraces pro rata sharing among general, unsecured creditors,
the incentive to engage in duplicative monitoring of the affairs of the
debtor is greatly reduced. Since each creditor is assured that the assets
142. See id. at 632.
143. See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Lessons of Maxwell Communications, 64
FORDHAM L. REv. 2531, 2541 (1996).
144. See Wilson Chu, Avoiding Surprises Through Due Diligence, BUSINESS LAW
TODAY, Jan./Feb. 1997, at 8.
145. See JACKSON, supra note 21, at 16.
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in any given country will not be parceled out to the first creditor to grab
the assets, it has less incentive to ensure that it is the first in line.
To be sure, there is still the obvious problem of multiple proceedings. Given the general adherence to the territorial approach, each
transnational bankruptcy generates a number of insolvency proceedings,
though it is unclear how much of a problem this is. For example, assume
a transnational firm in financial distress that should be liquidated. There
is no reason to seek to reorganize the firm; it is suffering from incurable
economic distress. It may be efficient to have each country handle the
liquidation of assets within its borders. As noted above, going to a foreign proceeding is expensive for creditors. If the firm's assets will be
sold, why should those sales not be conducted locally?
The case for the home jurisdiction rule is thus not as compelling as
its supporters suggest. For many firms, the territorial approach may
actually provide a superior set of insolvency rules. Moreover, the territorial approach may be able to replicate procedural universality when it is
appropriate to do so, as it did in the case of MCC. On balance, one cannot conclude that one approach dominates the other. Empirical evidence
is needed to ascertain the types of multinational firms which encounter
financial distress.
B. A ProceduralRule of Firm Choice
As an ex ante matter, one cannot identify which meta-ruleterritoriality or universalism with a single proceeding in the home
jurisdiction-better maximizes social welfare. These choices do not
exhaust the possible alternatives. A much better approach would be to
allow firms to specify in their corporate charter which country's or countries' insolvency laws will apply if the firm becomes insolvent.
This approach extends the general rule favoring party choice in
contractual settings. In many contractual settings, there is more than one
jurisdiction affected by the contract. Although the domestic and international conflict of law rules designating which law shall apply in
particular situations are often quite complex,'" the law has provided an
easy solution to this problem: within broad limits, let the parties decide
which law should apply. As a general matter, courts enforce contractual
provisions selecting which forum the dispute is to be litigated in'47 and
which law applies.'48 Indeed, courts will often enforce such provisions
even when they are certain that such enforcement will lead to a different
146. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 (1971).

147. See The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
148. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 146, § 187.
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substantive outcome than if the court decided the matter itself according
to its own law.4 9 A court will decline to enforce such provisions only
when following the law of the other jurisdiction would be contrary to
the fundamental policy of the court's own state.'50
The justification for the general rule of party choice is that it fulfills
the expectations of the parties, and allows them to ascertain with relative
certainty what their rights will be under the contract. 5' When two parties sign a contract containing a provision enforceable in the jurisdiction
in which one party is located, but not in the jurisdiction where the other
party finds itself, there is no ex ante reason to favor the policy judgment
of one jurisdiction over the other. Given this, the sensible solution is to
allow the parties to choose which jurisdiction's law shall apply.
The Supreme Court has endorsed this reasoning. In The Bremen v.
Zapata Co.,5 2 a U.S. shipper entered into a contract with a German
carrier to ship one of its drilling rigs. The contract contained a forumselection clause, which directed that disputes arising out of the shipment
be litigated in London. The contract also contained an exculpatory
clause protecting the carrier from claims arising out of damage to the
shipped drilling rig.'53 The U.S. shipper brought suit in the United
States. U.S. courts would not enforce the exculpatory clause, but English courts would.4 The Supreme Court held that the forum-selection
clause should be enforced, noting that "[t]he choice of [the English]
forum was made in an arm's-length negotiation by experienced and
sophisticated businessmen, and absent some compelling and countervailing reason it should be honored by the parties and enforced by the
courts."'55
The rule articulated in The Bremen should be extended to allow a
firm to select which forum should adjudicate its bankruptcy. Moreover,
although the conflicts of law principles generally distinguish choice of
forum from choice of law, in the bankruptcy context it makes sense to
combine these principles. Bankruptcy rules are notoriously complex. It
is fanciful to expect a court to apply the bankruptcy law of a foreign
country with anything approaching an acceptable degree of accuracy. 56
149. See, e.g., The Bremen, 407 U.S. 1.
150. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 146, § 187(2)(b).
151. See id., § 187 cmt. e; FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER, CHOICE OF LAW AND MULTISTATE

JUSTIc E 55-56 (1993).
152. The Bremen, 407 U.S. 1.
153. Id. at 3.
154. Id. at 8.
155. Id. at 12.
156. See, for example, Jay Westbrook's description of the English courts failure to understand American bankruptcy law in Felixstowe Deck & Railway Co. v. U.S. Lines, 2
Lloyd's Rep. 76 (1987) (the U.S. Lines case). Westbrook, supra note 8, at 480-82.
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Thus, for pragmatic reasons, a forum should generally apply its own
bankruptcy law. Moreover, even outside the bankruptcy context, courts
tend to apply their own law to multinational problems.'57 A firm should
not be allowed to select one country as the forum for the dispute, and
then specify that it should apply another country's bankruptcy law.
Subject to this restriction, firms should be allowed to specify which
country or countries should administer its affairs if it encounters financial distress. Just as in The Bremen, most of the firm's creditors are
likely to be sophisticated business people capable of looking after their
own interests. If international parties are free to adopt a forum that
would enforce an exculpatory clause which a U.S. court would not, why
should they not be free to choose a forum and its accompanying bankruptcy laws?
There are two obvious objections to the above argument, neither of
which withstands close examination. The first is that there is a coordination problem involved in the bankruptcy context which does not exist
in the standard two-party contract situation.' The two-party contract
only binds the immediate parties; other parties are usually not affected
by its provisions. In the bankruptcy context, however, the choice of a
bankruptcy regime affects all the firm's creditors. For example, if a firm
borrowed money from a bank and the lending agreement included a
clause which stated that if the firm encountered financial distress it
would file for bankruptcy in England, the enforcement of this clause
would affect all the firm's creditors. These creditors, however, may have
no reason to expect the bankruptcy to be held in England.
This problem can be easily overcome. Rather than having the bankruptcy selection in a single contract between the firm and one of its
creditors, the clause should be in the corporate charter to be enforceable.
This would notify all creditors as to where the firm's bankruptcy would
be held. 9
The second problem with allowing firms to select the bankruptcy forum is that the argument for choice does not extend to involuntary
creditors. This argument parallels the objection to allowing firms complete freedom in specifying the treatment of all of their creditors. By
157. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Choosing Law By Contract, 18 J. CORP. L. 245
(1993).

158. See Rasmussen, supra note 3, at 65-67.
159. For a detailed discussion of the benefits of using the corporate charter to specify
bankruptcy rules, and appropriate limitations on charter amendments, see Rasmussen, supra
note 3, at 16-21; Robert K. Rasmussen, Free Contracting in Bankruptcy at Home and
Abroad, in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (F.H. Buckley ed., forthcoming

1998) (on file with author). Those deciding to lend money to the firm would know to examine its charter to ascertain the situs of any future bankruptcy procedings.
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their nature, involuntary creditors have not made a decision to extend
credit to the firm. They thus did not have an opportunity to assess the
firm's choice of bankruptcy forum, and then decide if they were willing
to run the risk of having their claims adjudicated in that forum. Involuntary creditors thus risk having their claims settled in an inconvenient
forum according them lower priority than would the forum which would
otherwise handle their claim.
In the United States, this is not much of a burden, given that most
involuntary creditors are accorded a low priority-that of an unsecured
creditor.'9 If the United States. provided a more efficient and fair treatment of involuntary claimants, the firm's freedom of choice would have
to be restricted in order to protect that priority. Such protection could
come from a rule providing that U.S. courts would only enforce a forum-selection clause as applied to the involuntary creditor, where the
law of that court provides a priority at least as equal to the priority that
the creditor would receive in the U.S. court and where that court provides an effective means to resolve the claim.
The Bremen allows the application of such a rule. While the Supreme
Court in that case held that forum-selection clauses are presumptively
valid, it also held that they can be overcome when the party seeking to
avoid the bite of the clause "clearly show[s] that enforcement would be
unreasonable and unjust ....
,,6 To the extent a bankruptcy selection
clause lowers the priority of an involuntary claimant, the clause, as
applied to the given creditor is "unreasonable and unjust."
The rule of The Bremen should therefore be extended to the bankruptcy setting. Such an extension would allow firms to select from
among the bankruptcy laws of the various countries in which it operates
the one which it views as the most efficient. Indeed, to the extent that
countries would compete amongst each other to be selected as the provider of bankruptcy laws, this proposal, if followed, may lead to a
general increase in the efficiency of all country's bankruptcy laws.

160. For criticisms of this treatment from both economic and noneconomic perspectives, see Rasmussen, supra note 21, at 31-35; LoPucki, supra note 47, at 1907-16; Mark J.
Roe, Commentary on "The Nature of Bankruptcy": Bankruptcy, Priority,and Economics, 75

VA. L. REv. 219, 226-28 (1989); Leebron, supra note 105, at 1640-50.
161. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15.
162. The analogy here is the "race to the top" in U.S. corporate law. See generally
Ralph K. Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection,and the Theory of the Corporation,6 J.
LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977); ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW

14-24 (1993). Indeed, one could push the analogy further and argue that rather than allowing
a firm to specify in its corporate charter the country or countries in which it would file for
bankruptcy, firms should be required to file for bankruptcy in the jurisdiction in which they
are incorporated.
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CONCLUSION

Transnational bankruptcies are becoming an ever increasing event in
the global economy. To date, the legal regime has responded to the
problem by either ignoring it, or through modest efforts at governmental
regulation. Both responses are unsatisfactory. Ideally, if countries would
forgo their insistence on mandating the content of the bankruptcy laws,
each firm would, at the time of its formation, select its insolvency regime
from a menu of bankruptcy options.
Such fundamental change in transnational bankruptcy, while normatively desirable, is unlikely to occur in the near future. Current norms of
private international law, however, provide a vehicle for improving the
extant state of affairs. Courts should enforce provisions in corporate
charters which specify which country's or countries' bankruptcy law
should apply when the firm encounters financial distress. Adhering to
party choice would replace the current muddle of laws surrounding
transnational insolvencies with a more coherent approach.

